Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square
Comdominium Homeownders Association, Bruce
Manka, Frank Guyman : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dennis L. Mangrum, Esq.; Attorney for Appellee.
Sarah Hardy, Esq.; Young, Kester and Petro; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Cheap-o-rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Comdominium Homeownders Association, No. 20090166 (Utah Court of Appeals,
2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1545

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintifff, Appellee,

Vs.

Court of Appeals No. 20090166
MARMALADE SQUARE
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK
GUYMAN
Defendants/ Appellants.

APPELLEES' REPLY BRIEF %***/

APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT P. FAUST, PRESIDING

Sarah Hardy, Esq
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Attorney for Appellant

Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintifff, Appellee,

Vs.
Court of Appeals No. 20090166
MARMALADE SQUARE
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK
GUYMAN
Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLEES' REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT P. FAUST, PRESIDING

Sarah Hardy, Esq
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Attorney for Appellant

Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A. Nature of the case

2

B. Course of Proceeding Below

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I: STANDARD OF REVIEW

7

POINT II: PLAINTIFF'S 60(b) MOTION WAS TIMELY FILED
7
POINT III: JUDGE FAUST'S RULING SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT FITS THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)
8
POINT IV: JUDGE FAUST'S RULING FITS THE ANNOUNCED
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF 60(b)(1), THAT MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY GRANTED

11

POINT V: JUDGE FAUST'S RULING IS SUPPORTED BY THE
PLEADINGS AND FILE AS REFERENCED IN HIS ORDER GRANTING THE
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
14
POINT VI: DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
SHOULD BE DENIED
i

16

CONCLUSION

17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Menziesv. Gafe/Jb, 2006 UT 81,150 P.3d 480, 502

6,7,11,12,14

Lundv. Brown, 2000 UT 75, HP.3d277

7,10,12,13

Russell v.Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984)
State Dep't of Soc. Servs. V. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)
Helgesen v. Inyangumai, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081

7
7,12
10,11

May hew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952
(1962)

10,13

Cmty. Dental Servs. V. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2002)

12

Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962)

14

Olsenv. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977)

13

Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah 1989); In re S.H., 576 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1978)

15

Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160P.3d 1041

16

Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UTS5, 100 P.3d 1200

16

Pugh v. North Am. Warranty Servs., Inc., 2000 UT App 121,1 P.3d 570, 574
Turtle Management, Inc. V. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982)
Collierv. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

16

iii

16
17

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826

17

RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

2,6,7,8,10,11,12,14

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintifff, Appellee,

Vs.
Court of Appeals No. 20090166
MARMALADE SQUARE
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK
GUYMAN
Defendants/Appellants.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The appellee does not dispute this court's jurisdiction.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The only issue for this interlocutory appeal is whether Judge Faust abused his
discretion in granting appellee's motion to set aside its default judgment on the basis of
the pleadings and the file indicating that Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly calendared the
trial for the originally set trial date of November 14, 2008, rather than the changed trial
date of October 28,2008, and therefore missed the rescheduled trial date.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The sole issue in this case is determined by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
and the well established common law interpretations of this Rule that default
judgments should be liberally granted upon a reasonable justification if the motion to
set aside the default judgment is filed within the three month period of the judgment
and a reasonable ground is established within the discretion of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Plaintiff/appellee filed this collection action to recover for services
rendered for plumbing services provided the defendant/appellant. (R.l-11).
Defendants have argued that they did not have a contract with Plaintiff for the services
rendered.
B. Course of Proceedings Below
Defendant's unsuccessful motions to dismiss and multiple discovery delays have
continued this trial for more than three years. At the pretrial conference on July 22,
2008 (R.325-26), attended by both parties, a trial date was scheduled for November 14,
2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335). This is the trial date Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly
relied upon as the correct trial date even though the court apparently moved the trial
date earlier twice. Specifically, on July 25, 2008, the trial court's minute entry
2

indicates the trial date was expedited one month to October 14, 2008. (R. 337-39). On
July 29, 2008, the trial date was again changed to October 28, 2008 (340-41). In
preparation for the impending trial, Plaintiffs counsel submitted both his witness and
exhibit lists as required by the court at the pretrial conference. Everything in the
record indicated that the plaintiff was ready and willing to try the case on the
anticipated trial date. Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly kept the November 14, 2008 on
his calendar as the assigned trial date and, as a consequence, did not appear at the
rescheduled trial date of October 28, 2008. On October 28, 2008 when Plaintiffs did
not appear at the rescheduled trial date, defense counsel did not make a professional
courtesy phone call to see if a mistake in scheduling had been made in a case counsel
had been working on for more than three years, but instead immediately accepted a
default judgment.
When plaintiffs counsel was notified of the entry of the default judgment he
immediately filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on the basis of his mistake
in relying on the November 14 originally set trial date. In response, Judge Faust's
granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on February 4, 2009.
The Minute Entry reads: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules
that the default of any party previously entered is hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of
February 4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G").
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The Defendant/appellant filed this interlocutory appeal in response to Judge
Faust's order setting aside the default judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The plaintiff filed this collection action January 19, 2005 for

Plumbing services rendered to the defendant's condominium development. (R.l-11).
2.

The defendant has denied any responsibility under the service

contract. (R.42-52).
3.

Following the pretrial conference, on July 22, 2008 the court sent to the parties

notice that the Bench Trial was set for November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335).
Plaintiffs counsel relied upon this notice and scheduled the trial on his calendar for
November 14, 2008.
4.

The court's minute entry later shows that this trial date was

rescheduled to October 14, 2008, then changed again to October 28, 2008. (R. 333-39).
5.

Both parties timely filed their witness and exhibit designations in preparation for

trial as ordered by the trial court at the pretrial hearing on July 22, 2008 in preparation
for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65).
6.

On October 28, 2008 defense counsel appeared for the rescheduled trial date,

and when plaintiffs counsel failed to appear a default was granted, without a courtesy
phone call to see if a mistake had been made on scheduling.
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7.

Immediately upon learning about that he had made a mistake in scheduling the

trial date, plaintiff on November 3, 2008 filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment on the basis of counsel's mistaken belief that the trial had been set for
November 14, 2008 (the original trial date), rather then the October 28, 2008
(rescheduled trial date). The plaintiff explained in support of the motion to set aside
the following mistake he had made:
The plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14, 2008, and has
prepared for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally set for
November 14, 2008, and then changed to October 14, 2008, and then changed
again to October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November
14, 2008. The Plaintiff did not receive a phone call or any kind of notice on
October 28, 2008, that the trial was proceeding and the Defendant's attorney
knew the Plaintiff was ready for trial as exhibits and witness lists had been
mailed only weeks earlier.
The Plaintiff believes that the changes in setting of the trial dates caused
the confusion and is the reason the Plaintiff did not appear on October 28, 2008.
The Plaintiff has its case prepared and witness ready for trial on November 28,
2008.
Signed,
Dennis Mangrum
(R. 372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D").
8.

On February 4, 2009, Judge Faust signed a Minute Entry granting

plaintiff/appellee's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, explaining as a basis the
following: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the
default of any party previously entered is hereby set Aside." (Minute Entry of February
4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G").
5

9.

Defendants/appellant filed their Petition seeking permission to

Appeal from Judge Faust's February 4, 2009 Order setting aside the default judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Faust's granting of plaintiff s Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment did not constitute an abuse of discretion, but to the contrary, is consistent
with the Utah Supreme Court's directive in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d
480, 502, supported by other Utah well established authority that trial courts should
(1) liberally apply Rule 60(b), by granting a motion to set aside a default judgment for
a mistake; (2) enable the case to be decided on the merits; (3) respect the duty to be
"generally indulgent toward vacating default judgments;" (4) follow the judicial
directive to "incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party
may have a hearing;" and (5) adhere to the duty not "to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure and
timely application is made to set it aside." Thus Judge Faust's setting aside the default
judgment is not only well within his discretion, it furthers all the policies underlying
60(b) which favor a trial on the merits over the granting of a technical default based
upon a mistake in calendaring.
Lastly, the defendants/appellants have not established any facts supportive of
their claim that they are contractually entitled to attorney fees.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The well established standard of review for reviewing default judgments is an
abuse of discretion standard. The Utah Supreme Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006
UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, explained the standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions to set
aside a judgment as follows:
A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to set aside a default
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lund v.
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277; Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah
1984); State Dep't of Soc. Servs. V. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah
1983. Thus we review a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. (Id. at 502).
The trial judge granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on the
basis of plaintiff s mistaken understanding of the trial date due to the changes the
occurred that he did not calendar. This finding is within the trial court's discretion and
should not be set aside as an abuse of discretion.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S 60(b) MOTION WAS TIMELY FILED
A motion under Rule 60(b) must "be made within a reasonable time ... not more
than 3 months after the judgment ... was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The
default judgment was entered on October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff on November 3,
2008 filed MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND SET NEW TRIAL DATE (R.
7

372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D")(Exhibit attached to Defendant's Appellant Brief).
Clearly, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment within the
requisite three month specified by Rule 60(b).
POINT III.
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
FITS THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment if, among other things,
a claimant can demonstrate "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."
This case has been pending for three and a half years and has gone through several
stages of wrangling in preparation for trial. In Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment filed November 3, 2008 plaintiff explained and alleged the mistaken
belief in the trial date as the reason for his absence on the trial date as explained above.
(R. 372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D").
The factual reasons given in plaintiffs motion are corroborated by the court
judicially noticing the minute entries and pleadings in the file. A pretrial conference
was held on July 22, 2008, during which Dennis Mangrum appeared on behalf of the
Plaintiff. (Minute Entry dated July 7, 2008)(R. 333-335). At the pretrial conference, a
trial date was set for November 14, 2008. (R. 333-335). (Page 8 of Minute Entries)(R.
333-335). The court's Minute Entries indicate that on July 25, 2008 the trial date was
moved up one month to October 14, 2008. (R. 337-39). On July 25, 2008 the trial date
8

was again changed for the third time to October 28, 2008. (R. 340-41). The court's
Minute Entry of October 1, 2008 indicates that on October 2, 2008 the Plaintiff filed a
witness and exhibit list for the upcoming trial, demonstrating preparedness for trial. (R.
350-55, 356-65).
In Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs counsel alleged that he made a
mistake in the calendaring of the trial date, in that he relied on the initial trial date set
at the pretrial conference. (R. 372-373). He further alleged that he was prepared to go
to trial at any date the trial court may have reassigned for the trial. Judge Faust at the
hearing to Set Aside the Default Judgment obviously credited the Plaintiffs mistake.
(R.372-373). Consequently, on February 4, 2009 he granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment on the basis if the calendaring mistake alleged by
Plaintiffs counsel. (R. 400-401). The calendaring mistake alleged by Plaintiff has
been acknowledged by the defendant as the basis argued before Judge Faust in the
hearing of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and provides the factual basis
for the court exercising his discretion.
Judge Faust's granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on
February 4, 2009 (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009)(R. 400-401). The Minute Entry
reads: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of
any party previously entered is hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009:
R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G").
9

This exercise of his discretion as a trial judge reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion is
well established in the law of Utah. The Supreme Court in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT
75, 11 P.3d 277, reversed and remanded a default judgment for a mistake in the law as
to the consequence of bankruptcy filings. The court explained that "this court has
stated that 'it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a
default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear.' Helgesen v. Inyangumai, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (quoting Mayhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962))."
In Helgesen v. Inyangumai, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court
reversed and remanded a default judgment when the trial court abused its discretion
when he granted a default judgment despite reasons to believe the opponent had
intended to dispute the claim. The court noted that an insurance adjuster had been in
contact with plaintiffs counsel prior to filing the default. When the time for filing
arose and no answer had been filed, rather than making a courtesy of a phone call or a
warning the plaintiff that a default judgment would be pursued unless the plaintiff
responded, the defendant obtained an immediate default judgment. Reversing the
default judgment on appeal, the court expressed the opinion:
Under the circumstances the adjuster had every reason to believe that he would
be extended professional courtesy by the attorney with whom he was dealing
and would hear back from him .... He was reasonable in believing that no
default judgment would be taken in the meantime." (636 P.2d at 1081-82).
10

Under the facts of this case, after litigation for more than three years, a pretrial
conference attended by both counsel, the subsequent submission of witness and exhibit
lists by both parties, opposing counsel could have extended a professional courtesy of
phoning plaintiffs counsel to see if a mistake in scheduling or other exigent
circumstance had arisen before immediately seeking a default judgment. None of the
behavior of either counsel suggested that either was not ready to try the case. Justice
certainly would have been furthered by a professional courtesy phone call to see if a
mistake had been made.
It is well within the discretion of the trial judge to credit the allegations made in
support of the Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment. Indeed, as explained above,
the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b), and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, 502. Rule 60(b)
specifically affords the trial court discretion in determining whether a party seeking
equitable relief has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Judge Faust made such a finding in setting aside the Default Judgment and such ruling
should be affirmed.
POINT IV.
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING FITS THE ANNOUNCED EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES OF 60(b)(1), THAT MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY GRANTED
11

The Utah Supreme Court has frequently reversed and remanded under the abuse
of discretion standard when the trial court has refused to set aside a default judgment
when a coherent explanation for the default has been offered by counsel. For example,
the Utah Supreme Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, reversing
and remanding for the court's failure to grant a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a
judgment, rehearsed the well established rule that Rule 60(b) Motions to Set Aside
Default Judgments should be liberally granted to the end that cases may be decided on
the merits, rather than on technicalities:
[i]t is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of
the equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its
discretion in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the
merits rather than on technicalities. See, Id. Mussleman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56.
Accordingly, it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a 60(b)
motion to set aside a default judgment if there is a reasonable justification for
the moving party's failure and the party requested 60(b) relief in a timely
fashion. (Id. at 150 P.3d at 502).
The court added the following justification for liberally granting
motions to set aside default judgments:
Because of the equitable nature of the rule, a district court has broad discretion
to rule on a 60(b) motion. Lund, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277. However, this
discretion is tempered by the fact that the rule is designed to be remedial and
must be liberally applied. Id. See also, Cmty. Dental Servs. V. Tani, 282 F.3d
1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2002)(discussing rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). "[JJudgment by default is an extreme measure and a case
should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits." Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Dept. ofSoc.
Servs v. Mussleman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)(same). Accordingly, a
12

district court "should be generally indulgent toward" vacating default
judgments, Katz, 732 P.2d 93, and must "incline towards granting relief in a
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Lund, 2000 UT 75,
11 P.3d 277(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus "it is quite
uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure ...
and timely application is made to set it aside." (Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Similarly, in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951
(1962) the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded a default judgment. In doing
so the court review the liberal attitude the trial courts should consider when ruling on
timely filed motions to set aside a default judgment:
It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is endowed with considerable
latitude of discretion in granting or denying such motions. However, it is also
true that the court cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be generally
indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can
be settled advisedly and inconformity with law and justice. To clamp a
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously harsh
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our system of justice that each party
to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the
case. For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to set
it aside. (14 Utah 2d at 53-54).
Also, the court in Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977), in
Reversing and remanding for failure to set aside a default judgment, quoted the above
standard announced in Mayhew, and added: "Because an application to set aside a
default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience of the court, all the
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attendant circumstances should be considered. Relief in doubtful cases generally will
be granted so a party may have a hearing." (Citations omitted).
Under the facts of the case, the trial court's granting Plaintiffs Motion
to Set Aside the Default Judgment is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
directive in Menzies supported by other Utah cases that trial courts should (1) liberally
apply Rule 60(b), by granting a motion to set aside a default judgment for a mistake;
(2) enable the case to be decided on the merits; (3) respect the duty to be "generally
indulgent toward vacating default judgments;" (4) follow the judicial directive to
"incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
hearing;" and (5) adhere to the duty not "to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure and timely application is
made to set it aside." Judge Faust's setting aside the default judgment is not only well
within his discretion, it furthers all the policies underlying 60(b) which favor a trial on
the merits to a technical default based upon a mistake in calendaring.
POINT V.
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING IS SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND FILE
AS REFERENCED IN HIS ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Judge Faust's order granting Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment on February 4, 2009 (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009) was based upon the
file and the pleadings as recorded in his minute entry: "After review of the file and
14

pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of any party previously entered is
hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit
"G").
It is well established that a trial court may take judicial notice of the pleadings
and file. Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah 1989); In re S.H., 576 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1978). The appellant has made a number of unsupported factual accusations related to
whether plaintiffs mistake in scheduling the trial for the original trial date of
November 14, 2008 constituted "excusable neglect." However, none of appellant's
factual allegations suggesting that the plaintiff/appellee's mistake does not qualify for
excusable neglect are either supported by an affidavit by appellant, or are the relevant
to the fact of mistake. They are all unsupported factual claims contained only in a
memorandum filed in opposition to the motion to set aside, not by sworn affidavit.
The factual issue of mistake in calendaring, therefore, was both presented by
plaintiff/appellee's motion and responded to by appellant's memorandum, rather than
either formal testimony or affidavit testimony on either side. Appellant has conceded
that the justification for failing to appear at the October 28, 2008 rescheduled trial date
was a mistake and confusion in calendaring based upon three different trial dates
assigned for the trial, but has only suggested that the mistake does not amount to
excusable neglect. These conflicting trial dates are all a matter of record in the court's
own minute entries which the court took judicial notice of when it granted the motion
15

to set aside based upon the pleadings and file. They are supportive of the claim of
mistake which plaintiff/appellee alleged in his Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment and are competent evidence to base the court's ruling crediting the reliability
of the claim of mistake alleged and supported by the motion and contested by the
appellant.
POINT VI.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
SHOULD BE DENIED
Defendant makes the contradictory argument that it had not entered into a
contract with the plaintiff, but that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to plaintiffs
claim that a contract between the parties existed between the parties which provided
for attorney fees. If the Default Judgment is not set aside, there has been no factual
finding that a contract existed between the parties (a contested fact) that may justify an
award of attorney fees on behalf of either party.
In Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, one of the cases cited by
Appellant in support of a claim of attorney fees, the court acknowledged: "Generally,
attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by contract or by statute. Fericks v.
Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 100 P.3d 1200." See also, Pugh v. North Am.
Warranty Servs., Inc., 2000 UT App 121, 1 P.3d 570, 574, citing Turtle Management,
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Inc. V. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Collier v. Heinz,
827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826 requires as a prerequisite to granting attorney fees
on the basis of a contractual claim that the prevailing party establish at least one party
is entitled to attorney fees by contract. If the Order Setting Aside the Default
Judgment is reversed, then no court will have made a factual finding either that the
contract and the attorney fees associated with the contract were in force between the
parties and applies (Plaintiffs theory); or the contract is not binding on the Defendant
because he was not a party to the contract (Defendant's theory). Without a factual
finding relative to the whether the contract applies to the parties, no claim can be made
under the reciprocal attorney fees contained within 78B-5-826 that appellant is entitled
to attorney fess predicated on contract.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the showing of appellee's mistake in calendaring recognized by
Judge Faust as an adequate basis for setting aside the default judgment, and the
exercise of Judge Faust's discretion in crediting the allegation of mistake that is
supported by the court's minute entry records of the conflicting dates, together with
plaintiffs apparent trial readiness based upon an appearance at the pretrial conference
as well as the subsequent production of witness and exhibit lists filed after the pretrial
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conference in preparation for the trial, the trial court's granting of Plaintiff s Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment should be affirmed.

Dated this /£_ day of June, 2009

Dennis L. Mangrum
Attorney for Appellefej
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